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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 I am happy to find myself in very broad and deep agreement with 
Professor Adler’s thoroughly thought-provoking paper. He sets out a 
plausible normative basis for just the kind of administrative system I 
want to have, what I would call a reformed welfare state. This is the 
bureaucratic complement to Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom and 
                                                                                                                  
 * Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank 
Mark Seidenfeld for the invitation to participate in this symposium; I would also like to 
thank him and Matthew Adler for comments on this comment. Susan Avellone, Jed Free-
land, and Kristie Hatcher-Bolin provided willing and able research assistance. 
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Fourteen Points, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and Four Freedoms, 
and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty (and, I 
have to add, his campaign against communist imperialism). In Amer-
ica, we have no standard name or party that corresponds to this posi-
tion; in Europe, it is the decades-old platform of the social democ-
rats. 1  
 Adler offers his welfarist model of bureaucracy as an alternative 
to two competing schools of liberalism. The first is a right-liberal 
school he calls the neoclassical. His neoclassical school is essentially 
the Chicago school, the modern law-and-economics movement. I have 
little quarrel with Adler’s quarrel with the neoclassicals. 2 I suspect, 
as he argues, that wealth, in the neoclassicals’ technical understand-
ing of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, is not something we should value in 
itself. At best it is a crude, if sometimes highly instructive, proxy for 
something like the utilitarian’s happiness or Adler’s own, more so-
phisticated notion of welfare. 
 The other alternative is a fellow left-liberal school, which Adler 
calls the proceduralists. He has—and, for what it’s worth, I have—
little if any quarrel with the proceduralists’ substantive values. They, 
like Adler (and me), believe government should produce a complex 
but intuitively appealing mix that Adler calls welfare, commonly un-
derstood as the principled basis for the social-democratic notion of 
the welfare state (not, of course, in the narrower sense of a particular 
form of poverty relief program). Where he differs from his fellow 
travelers (and mine) on the liberal left is on the importance of proc-
ess. He maintains that process is never more than a means to the 
end of producing welfare; they maintain (more precisely, as we shall 
soon see, he maintains they maintain) that process is to be valued in 
and of itself. 
 Here we shall see a kind of double irony: In what we generally 
think of as administrative law, process is not valuable in the way the 
proceduralists seem to believe. There, again, Adler is right. But as to 
several important kinds of procedures about which Adler’s proce-
duralists have relatively little to say (criminal procedure, for exam-
ple), Adler himself, and all of us who are liberals, right-wing or left, 
will find procedure itself fundamentally important. 
 To see why this is so, we shall have, finally, to address my most 
basic disagreement with Adler. He believes in something about 
which I am profoundly skeptical: objective value or, stated somewhat 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See MICHAEL HARRINGTON, SOCIALISM: PAST AND FUTURE  1-2, 15 (1989). 
 2. As Adler notes, much of this criticism is not new, but none of it seems to have 
stuck with its targets. See Matthew Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist 
Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 244-67 (2000). For examples of an earlier 
academic generation’s critiques, which Adler duly acknowledges, see RONALD DWORKIN, A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE  236-89 (1985) (Part Four, The Economic View of Law). 
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differently, moral truth. Furthermore, he seems to believe that objec-
tive value and moral truth, or at least a belief in them, are the foun-
dation of the reformed welfare state in which he and I both believe. I 
am convinced otherwise. But I have an even deeper conviction: Even 
if I’m wrong about the vacuousness of objective value, my error is 
harmless; even if he’s right, his objective values are unhelpful. 
 My position comes to this paradox: Though Adler and I disagree at 
the highest theoretical level, that disagreement cannot have any ef-
fect whatsoever on our shared commitment to the welfare state here, 
as it were, on the ground. And the reason our disagreement cannot 
matter is that the reason he and I believe in social democracy tran-
scends any possible reason of the kind he is looking for. We do not be-
lieve in social democracy because it has been, or ever could be, proved 
to us as objectively right or true; we believe in it because it alone 
plausibly promises the kind of world we insist on living in, or at least 
working toward. 
 I want to begin my comment on Professor Adler’s paper with his 
disagreement with the proceduralists. I then want to examine his 
own welfarist notion of both process and substance, albeit very 
briefly. Next, I must follow his lead into the stratosphere that phi-
losophers call metaethics: literally, that which comes after (and in 
that sense lies beyond) ethics. 3 That meta-move, I’m convinced, is a 
snare and a delusion, if not a hunt for the snark. But it will take a bit 
of explaining to show you why. Be forewarned: To keep my points of 
disagreement with Professor Adler from seeming nit-picky, we will 
have to view his very fine piece from a broad, even panoramic, per-
spective. Finally, to merit my place on Professors Rossi and Sei-
denfeld’s excellent program, I must say a bit about what all this 
means for administrative law. 
II.   PROFESSOR ADLER’S QUARREL WITH “BIG-P” PROCEDURALISM 
 As I first read Adler’s piece, it seemed plausible to me that the 
various schools he classes as proceduralist4 do at least implicitly 
value process as an end in itself, not merely as a means to desirable 
outcomes. What’s more, I thought the proceduralists themselves 
would agree, too. Just to make sure, I asked one of them, one of my 
best friends and one of their best exemplars, Mark Seidenfeld.5 Much 
                                                                                                                  
 3. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 662 (2d ed. 1989). 
 4. Professor Adler includes among his Proceduralists believers in “interest represe n-
tation,” adherents of civic republicanism, and proponents of “collaborative governance.” 
Adler, supra note 2, at 243. 
 5. The equally good proof of both points is Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Jus-
tification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1992), especially footnote * 
(generously exaggerating my moral support in his writing of what has become one of the 
principal sources of civic republican bureaucratic theory), excerpted in PETER H. SCHUCK, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 25-27 (1994). As that article attests two points, our 
342  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:339 
 
to my surprise, he thinks he’s a “little-p” proceduralist rather than a 
“Big-P” Proceduralist. Simply put, he says he sees process as a 
means only, not as an end or good or value in itself. 
 But Seidenfeld is wrong here; more precisely, he doesn’t know 
what he really believes. On this point, I claim—perhaps arrogantly, 
but please await the proof—to know him better than he knows him-
self. My superior knowledge on this point is possible because I have 
had one experience that he has never had and can never have: I have 
had a conversation with him. In fact, I have had many conversations 
with him, two of the topics of which are directly relevant to Adler’s 
claim and to Seidenfeld’s denial that he is a Big-P Proceduralist. 
These two topics are personal virtue and social justice or, less ab-
stractly, “How can I be good?” and “How can we be just?” 
 These are, of course, the two central and inseparable subjects of 
the Platonic dialogues, the twin foci of Western normative philoso-
phy. To understand the dispute between Adler and Seidenfeld, we 
must distinguish these two related subjects, social justice and per-
sonal virtue. Once we make this distinction, we have the key to the 
controversy: It is possible to be a proceduralist on one or both points, 
or neither. I believe that Seidenfeld, and with him most civic republi-
cans, and perhaps others Adler identifies as Big-P Proceduralists, 6 
are guilty (or virtuous) as charged as to both social justice and per-
sonal virtue. Here Adler is right; Seidenfeld and his fellow Proce-
duralists value process as such. But, on a deeper point, Adler is 
wrong. He maintains that process is not an independent value. But 
all of us—not just the civic republicans among us—believe firmly 
that it is. Otherwise, I submit, we wouldn’t be here, engaged in this 
discussion. 
A.   Four Arenas of Process 
 To make my point—to prove both that the civic republicans are 
Big-P Proceduralists and that process is, as they maintain, inher-
ently valuable—we must map out in more detail the normative terri-
tory that includes both personal virtue and social justice. In particu-
lar we need to distinguish four paradigmatic levels at which process 
occurs. The debate between Adler and the civic republicans occurs at 
what I’ll call the macrocosmic level, the level of policymaking in 
                                                                                                                  
friendship and his scholarly eminence, so may this footnote. In one respect, this is more a 
self-fulfilling prophecy than a prayer; by citing my friend’s work in my own, I automati-
cally raise his stock on the Eisenberg-Wells exchange (even as I further debase the already 
dubiously inflated currency of that exchange). See Theodore Eisenburg & Martin T. Wells, 
Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law Schools, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 377 
(1998) (“[T]he most often cited articles tend to be regarded as those with the highest qual-
ity.”). 
 6. See supra note 4. 
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SUPRA-
MACROCOSMIC 
(rational government  
of the universe; theodicy) 
 
 
 
MACROCOSMIC 
(modern national politics;  
administrative law) 
 
 
 
MICROCOSMIC 
(face-to-face political communities;  
law school faculty meetings;  
New England town meetings) 
 
 
 
SUB-MICROCOSMIC 
(personal relationships; 
friendships and love) 
modern nation-states and their aggregates, regional groups like the 
European Union, and inter-
national bodies like the 
United Nations. This is the 
classic arena not only of 
administrative law, but also, 
and more generally, of both 
electoral and legislative 
politics. And this arena is, 
finally, the focus of modern 
political theory. 
 Just below the macro-
cosmic lies what I shall call 
the microcosmic level at 
which process occurs. Here 
I’m thinking of small, semi-
autonomous, quasi-political 
units like the mythic New 
England town, the modern American law school, and (farther up, 
near the border with the political macrocosm) the ancient Greek po-
lis. At this level process occurs in a face-to-face setting; here all the 
members of the relevant units know, or at least recognize, each 
other. 
 The other two levels at which process occurs lie, respectively, be-
low the microcosm of face-to-face political communities and above the 
macrocosm of modern politics. The sub-microcosmic realm is that of 
personal, as opposed to political, relationships: the realm of friend-
ships, love affairs, marriages, and nuclear families. The final, supra-
macrocosmic realm above modern politics may exist, I hasten to ad-
mit, only in myth and theory. This is the misty realm of classical 
theodicy and, maybe, modern physics’ anthropic principle.7 It is the 
realm in which theorists, poets, and perhaps physicists try to “justify 
the ways of God to men.”8 
 It will be readily apparent that these four levels of process are 
really bands on a spectrum. They begin with the most intimate rela-
tions between two individuals, range through various voluntary as-
sociations into the smallest properly political units, from there in ex-
panding scope up to the most inclusive international organizations 
and, ultimately, to what was once called, without embarrassment or 
                                                                                                                  
 7. See Steven Weinberg, A Designer Universe?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 21, 1999, at 46 
(reviewing books on the anthropic principle). 
 8. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST bk. 1, l. 26 (John A. Himes ed., American Book Co. 
1898); see also Job 34. The conclusions, of course, are not always so sanguine, see 
VOLTAIRE , CANDIDE (Random House ed. 1928) (1759), or so certain, see THORNTON WILDER, 
THE BRIDGE OF SAN LUIS REY (1928). 
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metaphor, the rational government of the universe. The lines I’ve 
drawn between my four levels are thus neither absolutely precise nor 
wholly arbitrary. These lines are, of course, much debated, and for 
some purposes they will need to be better drawn. But for our pur-
poses they will work well enough. 
B.   The Case Against the Inherent Value of Procedure 
in the Political Microcosm 
 With this spectrum of arenas of process as our backdrop, let’s look 
again at the question of whether Seidenfeld and his fellow civic re-
publicans are, as Adler charges and as at least Seidenfeld denies, 
Big-P Proceduralists—whether, in other words, they value process as 
an end in itself, rather than as a means only. Most of their writing, it 
is important to note, considers the macrocosm of national politics. It 
is difficult to make Adler’s case at this level, however, because Sei-
denfeld and his fellows9 can interpose a practical impediment to 
Adler’s theoretical claim. They can admit in theory that they would 
accept an administrative regime that produced the goods they prefer 
without the process they recommend, even while they can maintain 
that, in practice, no such regime can ever exist. They can plausibly 
argue that any real regime capable of delivering the goods will al-
ways have to follow something like their deliberative procedure. 
 There are, however, microcosms where this may well not be true. 
More specifically, there may be small political communities in which 
the outcomes civic republicans prefer can be produced by radically 
nondeliberative processes. In such communities, I hope to show you, 
Seidenfeld and his ilk would still insist, just as Adler predicts, on 
preserving their brand of process, even though it does nothing to en-
hance substantive values beyond itself. If I’m right, they value proc-
ess for its own sake, at least in this arena, and thus Adler is right to 
call them Big-P Proceduralists here, if not elsewhere. 
 Fortunately for my and Adler’s case at this point, it happens that 
I live with Mark Seidenfeld in just such a microcosmic political com-
munity: the modern American law school. The perspective I am about 
to offer you on that kind of community comes from another good 
friend of mine at another law school. 10 This other friend once com-
plained to me that the new dean of his school was irritatingly in-
clined toward faculty democracy. Taking the bait, and echoing Chur-
chill, 11 I asked my friend what alternative to faculty democracy he 
                                                                                                                  
 9. In the remainder of this section, I focus on civic republicans; hence my point may 
not apply to all shades of Adler’s Proceduralists. See supra note 4. 
 10. For reasons that, as we shall soon see, have to do with the content of his example, 
this friend is probably best left anonymous. 
 11. Churchill said, “No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it 
has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms 
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could possibly prefer. Decanal dictatorship was his answer. In this 
latter model, as he described it, the dean serves for an indefinite 
term and never holds faculty meetings. If he or she produces good re-
sults, in the eyes of the faculty, his or her tenure goes on forever. But 
there is a downside—at least for the dean. If he or she produces bad 
results (again, in the eyes of the faculty), then the entire offending 
administration is metaphorically marched out into the quadrangle 
and shot, shortly to be replaced by a new dictator-dean responsible, 
as before, only for delivering the goods. 
 This microcosmic scenario nicely isolates the Mark Seidenfeld po-
sition—and, I suspect, the entire civic republican position—as Big-P 
Proceduralist. I believe even Seidenfeld has to admit that govern-
ment on this small a scale could achieve, without the deliberative 
process he prefers, the ends that he sees as ideal (in particular, 
higher pay, perquisites, and status for people like him, that is, people 
who do the kind of scholarship he and his friends do and who teach it 
to their students). In this microcosm, in other words, nondeliberative 
government—indeed, dictatorial government—could achieve the ends 
Seidenfeld and his fellow civic republicans insist can only flow, in the 
macrocosm of federal administrative law, from deliberative govern-
ment. 
 But even so—and this is the QED of my Adlerian argument—
Seidenfeld and the other civic republicans would insist on massive 
doses of deliberation at the microcosmic, law school level. They might 
agree with Adler’s neoclassicists that, as Oscar Wilde is supposed to 
have remarked about Fabian socialism, macrocosmic socialism takes 
too many evenings. But they would never accept a law school ad-
ministration without regular and (preferably) frequent faculty meet-
ings. For them, I suspect, deliberation is not a bitter potion we have 
to swallow to ward off the dysfunctions of dictatorship; it is, instead, 
an elixir they find rather tasty (and tend to insist that we join them 
in toasting) even if their interminable symposium slows down or di-
minishes delivery of the very goods we want. Like the English, they 
will share their pot of deliberative tea at four in the afternoon, 
though the ship of their micro-state go the way of the Titanic. Thus, 
if I know Seidenfeld (and, by extension, his fellow civic republicans) 
as well as I think, they are, just as Adler argues, Big-P Procedural-
ists. 
                                                                                                                  
that have been tried from time to time.” Winston S. Churchill, Speech Before the House of 
Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-
1963, at 7566 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974). 
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C.   The Case for the Inherent Value of Procedure 
in Macro-level Adjudication 
 But there is another side to the coin of Big-P Proceduralism. On 
this side, I believe, Adler himself is also, in important respects, a Big-
P Proceduralist—as, I hope, are all the rest of us. To see why this is 
so, we have to move back to the macrocosmic level of modern political 
process. Further, we have to focus on a procedural distinction deeply 
and properly ingrained in both administrative law and, more 
broadly, modern political theory: the distinction between legislation, 
or making laws of general application, and adjudication, or the appli-
cation of law to particular cases. 12 The legal realists, of course, long 
ago showed that this bipolar opposition is far from perfect, 13 and 
modern administrative theorists hotly debate where the line should 
be drawn in particular decisionmaking contexts. 14 
 For our purposes, however, the important point to note is that 
Adler’s asserted little-p proceduralism—his insistence that process is 
only a means, never an end—depends for its plausibility upon a 
rulemaking rather than rule-applying context. To see why it loses 
much of its appeal outside the legislative context (where, at least to 
me, it is convincing), consider the case of criminal defense. And, to up 
the ante, consider me the criminal defendant. Assume I stand ac-
cused before the law school administration or, better yet, the state of 
Florida, of a very serious offense. Suppose one of my students asserts 
that, after regular business hours, in the relative privacy of my office, 
where we were supposed to be working together on a response to 
Adler’s paper, I sexually assaulted him or her. 
 In such a case, the adjudicative process obviously matters very 
much to all of us. Less obviously, that process matters as more than 
a means to the socially desired outcome—my conviction if I’m guilty 
or exoneration if I’m innocent. That process also matters in and of it-
self. To see why this is so, let’s focus on my own role in my case. 
 In the criminal phase of my case, I will be accorded, under the 
criminal procedures of Florida and all other Western-style democra-
cies, 15 an opportunity to call witnesses, including the complainant. 
                                                                                                                  
 12. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. 
V 1999) (distinguishing between the two); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, 
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.8 (3d ed. 1994); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 
(James Madison); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE  LAWS bk. 3, at 21-24 (Anne M. Cohler 
et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). 
 13. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). 
 14. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 89-90 (1975); 
Frederick Schauer, A Brief Note on the Logic of Rules, with Special Reference to Bowen v. 
Georgetown University Hospital, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 447, 454 (1990). 
 15. The so-called inquisitorial civil law system is at least as insistent as the Anglo-
American “adversarial system” on this right. See, e.g., Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative 
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Revealingly, this right is known, at least here in America, as the 
right to confront my accuser.16 Admittedly, that right is consistent 
with a purely outcome-oriented understanding of criminal procedure. 
The right to confront may help ensure a just outcome by increasing 
the probability that I will be exonerated if I am innocent. If my ac-
cuser must take the stand, the trier of fact can assess his or her 
credibility, making false testimony at least marginally less likely.17 
 But the probative value of this process is doubly dubious.18 On the 
one hand, truth-telling witnesses are notoriously easy to rattle—
perhaps especially easy to rattle, given the trauma they have truly 
experienced and are being forced, in a very real sense, to relive. On 
the other hand, lying witnesses may be well coached by counsel or co-
conspirators, and being a good liar means, almost by definition, being 
personally persuasive. 
 I think, accordingly, that the right to confront one’s accuser has 
another function, a function that takes us directly to the inherent 
value of procedure, at least in some such critical adjudicative proc-
esses. Faced with severe public shame and private loss—certainly 
dismissal from my job and possibly loss of my physical freedom—I 
very deeply want to confront my accuser and also my judges. I want 
to be able to look each in the face, and I want each to have to look me 
in the face, or drop their eyes and lose face. In our culture, to look 
one’s accuser unblinkingly in the eye is tantamount to saying, “If you 
dare bear false witness against me, be damned.”19 
 I’m not alone in wanting this right of confrontation. You deeply 
want me to have this right, too—if you call yourself a liberal. And the 
reason for our agreement on this point is significant. The shared de-
sire of all liberals for anyone accused of a serious crime to have this 
right to confront the accusers is independent of any truth-producing 
effect.20 I want to be there at my own trial—and you want me to be 
able to be there—even if the color of my skin, or the shadow on my 
cheeks, or the anger in my eyes makes my unjust conviction more 
likely rather than less. To deny me this—even if you can guarantee 
me a more just outcome in my case—is, in the liberal world-view, to 
deny me an essential element of my dignity as a human being. To 
                                                                                                                  
Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 361, 367 
(1977). 
 16. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 17. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 953 (9th ed. 1999). 
 18. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474-76 (1969). 
 19. See, e.g., Exodus 20:16 (King James) (“Thou shalt not bear false witness against 
thy neighbour.”).  
 20. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and 
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1140-42 (1982) (analyzing due proc-
ess in criminal trials in terms of fair play in agonistic contexts). 
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promise to save me, even to deliver on that promise, is not enough; 
you must let me work for my own salvation, even if it means only 
worsening my prospects and witnessing my own destruction. 
 Let’s sum up this section. Adler alleges that the civic republicans 
and other administrative law proceduralists value process as an end 
in itself, not merely as a means to such ends as the greater produc-
tion or fairer distribution of welfare. Seidenfeld, at least, denies this, 
in both the microcosm and the macrocosm. But, as my example of de-
canal dictatorship shows, Seidenfeld may be wrong here; he may, 
that is, mistake his addiction to process for a mere taste. If I’m right 
(and I am) Seidenfeld and his closest civic republican fellow travelers 
believe in the inherent value of process at both the macro- and micro-
cosmic level, and in matters of both legislation and adjudication at 
each level. On the other hand, my criminal defense paradigm shows 
that Adler himself is probably also, despite his assurances to the con-
trary, a Big-P Proceduralist, at least in the limiting case of criminal 
law adjudication. And so, I earnestly hope, are we all. 
 In case you are curious about my own position, let me put my 
cards on the table. I, with Adler, am a very little-p proceduralist in 
matters of rulemaking at the macrocosmic level of national politics. 21 
At the microcosmic, law school level, I’m an even littler little-p pro-
ceduralist. I’m convinced that a good decanal dictator would deliver 
more of the goods I want (and that a bad decanal dictator would cost 
me no more in terms of those same goods) than any conceivable de-
liberative regime. Even if I’m wrong, the dictatorial regime’s savings 
in transaction costs would be substantial and, at least for me, that 
alone would almost certainly be full enough compensation. Faculty 
democracy, the microcosmic equivalent of Fabian socialism, takes far 
too many afternoons. 
 This last complaint warrants amplifying as a coda to this section: 
Governmental process in and of itself is much more often experienced 
as a cost than as a benefit, a pain rather than a pleasure, unless your 
tastes run much more toward the civic republican than mine. This 
truth is nicely captured out in my neck of the woods by a poster be-
hind the meat counter at Bradley’s Country Store: 
                                                                                                                  
 21. I suspect that, in this respect, I am not merely with Adler, but beyond him. Two of 
my favorite regimes were not only dubiously deliberative at the macrocosmic level; they 
were also distinctly undemocratic: Oliver Cromwell’s mid-seventeenth-century Protestant 
protectorate in the British Isles and Franz Joseph Hapsburg’s late nineteenth -century 
Roman Catholic empire in central Europe. But one need only examine the status of Jews 
under the Protector and the Emperor to appreciate their achievements in meritocracy and 
toleration, achievements never matched, to my knowledge, in any democracy, including, 
perhaps, our own. See, e.g., THE NEW STANDARD JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 248 (7th  ed. 1992); 
see also ABBA EBAN, HERITAGE : CIVILIZATION AND THE JEWS 208 (1984) (describing Crom-
well’s sponsorship of Jewish immigrant settlement in England and its colonies); Michael 
Ignatieff, The Rise and Fall of Vienna’s Jews, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 29, 1989, at 21. 
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Arguing with a federal meat inspector about regulations is like 
wrestling with a big hog in the mud; after a couple of rounds, you 
come to realize that only one of you is enjoying yourself.22 
 So far, I have said nothing about the other two critical points on 
my spectrum of process: the sub-microcosmic, personal level and the 
supra-macrocosmic, universal level. I have not, however, identified 
those points for nothing. Only with them in mind can we fully appre-
ciate Adler’s substantive position, to which we should now turn. 
Moreover, only at these two levels can we adequately address Adler’s 
meta-move, which I will discuss in section IV. As we shall see in each 
of these sections, substance and procedure are intimately and inex-
tricably connected, at least at the highest and lowest levels of proc-
ess, the personal and the universal. 
III.   PROFESSOR ADLER’S PREFERENCE FOR WELFARISM 
 Adler identifies several candidates for the substantive good of so-
cial justice—economic efficiency, autonomous choice, overall well-
being, equal distribution of well-being, and various perfectionist and 
deontological criteria.23 He criticizes some, particularly the putative 
value of economic efficiency, and defends others, particularly his own 
favorite, which he calls “welfare.” This, as he points out, is close to 
the happiness of sophisticated utilitarians like Mill—those, as he in-
dicates, who can distinguish with Mill between satisfied pigs and 
dissatisfied Socrateses. 24 
 His principal difference with the utilitarians lies in his rejection of 
their monistic view of value. Their reductivist insistence on happi-
ness alone produces all manner of burry old chestnuts25 that he 
avoids with the importation of a plurality of values. This theoretical 
expedient blunts much of the charge that utilitarianism would con-
stantly cut corners with practical expedients like sacrificing the life 
of one for the happiness of many. Such sacrifices may make for 
greater overall welfare, Adler admits, but only at unacceptable costs 
in other values—deontological and perfectionist values in particu-
lar—that utilitarianism notoriously ignores but that Adler himself is 
happy to count. 
                                                                                                                  
 22. Bradley’s Country Store, about fifteen miles north of Tallahassee on Old Center-
ville Road, is listed in the National Register of Historic Places. See National Register In-
formation System, at http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/research/nris.htm (visited Oct. 25, 2000). 
The pork sausage is especially fine, though I must admit to having turned a Bismarckian 
blind eye to the process of its production. 
 23. See Adler, supra note 2, at 288. 
 24. See id. at 288-89, 297; see also JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 14 (Oskar Pi-
est ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1957) (1861). 
 25. See J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 79-80 
(1973); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 51-60 (1981). 
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 Adler’s value-pluralism itself, of course, comes at a cost. As he 
admits, his multiplicity of goods, none reducible entirely to any other, 
strikes us as less elegant than utilitarianism’s single touchstone.26 
We, like our fellows in physics, crave a unified field theorem. 27 And, 
as Adler also admits, his multiple goods require rank orderings, or at 
least ad hoc balances, that utilitarianism’s single good neatly avoids. 
Complex protocols must govern Zeus and Odin’s famously fractious 
family feasts; Jehovah and Allah presumably dine in peace at the 
heads of tables for one (and certainly in separate celestial palaces). 
 The way that Adler presents his multiple values and deals with 
conflicts among them is highly instructive and—if I may be so bold as 
to say—entirely admirable. He presents them to us as values that 
are already our own. As a matter of fact, he almost certainly gets this 
right. I reckon, with him, that none among us rejects any value that 
he presents, and I don’t imagine, any more than he, that he has left 
out any value any of us takes as fundamental, or even very impor-
tant.28 
 In a moment, we will need to reflect on our general agreement 
about basic values: why it is so and what it may mean. Let’s look 
first, however, at the point where, as Adler rightly suspects, our 
agreement about values is likely to break down. We are quite likely 
to rank our shared values differently, if not in the abstract, then at 
least as they come up in specific cases. Thus, to take what may be the 
most significant example in the macrocosm of politics, many of us 
conscientiously differ about the proper trade-off between the good of 
alleviating undeserved wealth disparities and the attendant cost in 
productive incentives; to put it crudely, how much to take from the 
rich to give to the poor. Adler admits as much 29 and recommends to 
us the balance he prefers. 
 His balance values the fullest realization of the maximum number 
of human capabilities in the widest possible range of individuals, 
consistent with all the fundamental values traditionally cherished in 
the West. What’s at least as significant, he offers a realistic prospect 
of delivering on what he promises.30 More specifically, he values the 
market economy’s emphasis on individual choice, and he recognizes 
                                                                                                                  
 26. See Adler, supra note 2, at 300. 
 27. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 49 (1971) (“It is simply good fortune 
that the principles of celestial mechanics have their intellectual beauty.”). 
 28. For this assessment to be fully accurate, I should specify that my “us” means 
those who place themselves inside the very wide spectrum of liberal humanism. 
 29. See Adler, supra note 2, at 321-22. 
 30. Cf. LEO STRAUSS AND JOSEPH CROPSEY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 908 
(3rd ed. 1987) (describing Strauss’s understanding of the purpose of the modern West to be 
“the construction of a universal society of free and equal nations of free and equal men and 
women enjoying universal affluence, and therefore universal justice and happiness, 
through science understood as the conquest of nature in the service of human power”).  
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the market economy as the only system with any real prospect of 
achieving, maintaining, and expanding the standard of living now 
enjoyed in the West. 
 For what it’s worth, I’m quite happy with the balance he strikes. 
It is pretty much the New Dealish, Great Society nostalgia you’d ex-
pect from any academic outside Chicago (taken as a School, not a 
city). Substantively, that is to say, I’m solidly behind Adler’s chas-
tened welfare state. I’m a bit more skeptical about the processes—the 
reformed administrative regime—he recommends as the means of 
getting us there. But here my skepticism is purely empirical; if I 
were convinced his administrative procedures would work, I’d have 
no principled objection to them. 
IV.   PROFESSOR ADLER’S WRONG TURN (OR UNNECESSARY DETOUR): 
THE “META-MOVE”31 
 What I want to focus on, however, is neither the substantive out-
comes Adler recommends nor the procedural reforms he advances as 
the most effective means to those ends. Instead, I want to focus on a 
different process and a different substance: the process by which 
Adler tries to persuade us of his position and the substantive founda-
tion of both that position’s recommended procedures and its pre-
ferred outcomes. This will take us back to the issue I deferred just 
now: Why do we share so many values, and what does that tell us?  
 Let me give you my conclusion. The process by which Adler rec-
ommends his position, the mode in which he casts his entire presen-
tation, is essentially dialogic, and hence Socratic. We shall see in a 
bit what that entails. For now, it is enough to say that I wholeheart-
edly endorse it. To return to our four-phase spectrum of process are-
nas, I embrace the process Adler employs at the interpersonal, sub-
microcosmic level to present to us his position on both substantive 
values and administrative processes at the macrocosmic, political 
level. 
 But, having said that, I must sound a note of serious disagree-
ment. What Adler says about the substantive basis for his positions, 
both substantive and procedural, is at worst wrong, and at best un-
necessary. At the risk of obscuring with technical terms, 32 I must 
                                                                                                                  
 31. This section of my paper should be dedicated to the late Leon Lipson of the Yale 
Law School. According to one of his colleagues, the late Arthur Leff, Lipson once boasted, 
presumably in jest, “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” A.A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, 
Unnatural Law , 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230 n.2 (1979). 
 32. In one of our earliest ethical conversations, see supra note 5, Mark Seidenfeld 
identified a nagging problem: “not knowing the -isms and the -ologies.” I offered to write 
them out for his convenient reference on a 3-by-5 index card; for a summary that is doubt-
lessly clearer, and only slightly longer, see 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 578 (15th ed. 
1998). 
352  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:339 
 
question Adler’s metaethics even as I embrace his ethics.  33 More im-
portantly, even if I’m wrong about metaethics, I think I can show 
that my mistake cannot matter to my agreement with Adler on eth-
ics. Indeed—and here things get a little weird—the reason that our 
metaethical disagreement cannot undercut our ethical agreement at 
the macrocosmic level is precisely the reason why my metaethics is 
better, and why the dialogic procedure he and I share at the sub-
microcosmic, personal level is the best. On the other hand, precisely 
that sub-microcosmic procedure—Socratic dialogue—is very much at 
odds with Adler’s metaethics at all levels, as to substance as well as 
process. 
A.   Making the Meta-Move 
 If I haven’t lost you already, I must try to give some content to 
these abstractions. First, let’s look back at the way Adler makes the 
case for his particular mix of substantive values and administrative 
processes. As we have seen, he presents them to us as a mutually ac-
ceptable balancing of shared values; he invites us, in the manner of 
the political philosopher John Rawls, to reach with him a “reflective 
equilibrium.”34 Notice, for now, how different that is from two other 
familiar reasoning processes. Unlike the mathematician, Adler does 
not begin with a set of unproved axioms and reason deductively from 
them to a proof that all rational people would, as such, see as correct. 
Nor does he follow Ronald Dworkin’s mythical liberal judge, Hercu-
les, extrapolating from the data of our entire legal culture by a proc-
ess which, while not precisely deductive, is supposed to give objec-
tive, and usually single, right answers to legal questions.35 Adler 
simply draws up for us a normative world—an ordering of values—
and asks us to join him in working toward its realization (or to show 
him something more appealing). 
 By my lights, that’s quite enough; indeed, almost certainly all that 
is possible. But Adler explicitly believes there is more, and he implic-
itly suggests at several points that he would provide more, and could 
provide more, if only he had more time or space. What is this more? 
For Adler, it is some kind of proof that the values he is ordering (and 
perhaps the ordering itself, and the process by which that ordering is 
recommended to us and implemented in the world) is “really” and 
                                                                                                                  
 33. It is worth noting that the opposite can also occur. Thus, for example, Richard 
Posner and I share a skeptical metaethical position, although he emphatically rejects the 
ethical position I, with Adler, embrace: social welfarism. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF LEGAL AND MORAL THEORY 3-17, 51 (1999) (embracing metaethical 
skepticism but ridiculing “welfare liberalism”). 
 34. RAWLS, supra note 27, at 48-52. 
 35. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE at vii-viii, 225-66, 337-54 (1986); DWORKIN, 
supra note 2, at 117-177 (Part Two, Law as Interpretation). 
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“objectively” “right” or “true.” I place these last two adjectives and 
adverbs in scare quotes to “problematize” them. 36 They pose, I’m 
afraid, real but avoidable problems, the very kind of fly-bottle Witt-
genstein famously declared proper philosophy to be in the business of 
getting philosophers out of.37  
 Is there, above or beyond all the competing values and value sys-
tems afoot in the land, some ultimate arbiter of the right and the 
good, some atemporal, transcendent, and true template that is the 
measure of all normative claims? Beyond this question, the signpost 
on the high road to metaethics, lie two paths. 38 Adler, as we have 
seen, takes the path marked “yes.” If this is not the first path, it is by 
far the best trodden. Those who take it believe that ultimate, objec-
tive values await our discovery somewhere “out there” and that we 
will know them when we see them. Accordingly, they know them-
selves as cognitivists, and they insist that the values they seek—or 
know—are “real” or “objective.” In technical metaethical terms, their 
epistemology is cognitivist; their metaphysics, realist. 39 
 The other path through the alps of metaethics takes the opposite 
turn, in the direction of a more or less thorough-going skepticism 
about the existence or knowability of the kind of values the cognitiv-
ists seek. Hard skeptics deny any such values; softer skeptics doubt 
them to varying degrees. But all stop at the Scottish verdict: Not 
proved. All modern skeptics, the soft as well as the hard, are brought 
up short by David Hume’s musing: 
 I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, 
which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system 
of morality . . . I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds 
for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes 
the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human af-
fairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the 
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. 
                                                                                                                  
 36. Problematizing is, of course, postmodern jargon for pointing out an oddity, the 
sort of thing Socrates did classically, and presumably with inflection rather than punctua-
tion; putting problemetizing itself in scare quotes, of course, problematizes the postmodern 
posture of problematizing everything in a self-consciously self-referential way. On this and 
other postmodern postures, see Steven Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship The-
ory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1996), and TERRY EAGLETON, THE ILLUSIONS OF 
POSTMODERNISM 28 (1996). 
 37. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 309, at 103e 
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953). 
 38. See 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPEDIA 980 (15th ed. 1974) (“The cognitiv-
ist and noncognitivist are two main varieties of meta-ethical doctrines on the meanings of 
ethical terms and judgments and the methods of supporting the judgments.”). 
 39. See id. (“The cognitivist doctrines affirm and the noncognitivists deny that moral 
terms signify qualities in the world and that moral judgments are a kind of knowledge.”); 
see also Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality For Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853, 
874-81 (1992). 
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This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last conse-
quence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new rela-
tion or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and ex-
plain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for 
what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be 
a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. . . . 
[T]his small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of mo-
rality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not 
founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by rea-
son.40 
 As you may know—or safely have guessed—the air up here in the 
metaethical stratosphere is really rarified. Lest you lose interest—if 
not consciousness—let me briefly sketch why Adler leads us up here, 
and why we needn’t take his way out to arrive at his political posi-
tion. (If it’s any consolation at this dark point, remember the light we 
left in the distance and are headed back to: I disagree radically with 
Adler’s metaethics but embrace whole-heartedly his explicit welfarist 
politics and his implicitly dialogic ethics. What I’m trying to show 
you now is how to believe in the virtues of Adler’s earthly politics and 
ethics without buying into his metaethical heaven, which may well 
be a vacuum.) 
B.   Professor Adler’s Causes for Concern 
Why does Adler invite us to venture with him up this theoretical Ev-
erest? Emphatically for our own good, to save us from two snares, the 
first quite real, the second wholly illusory. 
1.   The Illogic of Deriving Proceduralism from Metaethical 
Skepticism 
 The first (and very real) snare is the illogic of inferring Big-P Pro-
ceduralism from metaethical skepticism. As Adler ably shows, it is 
both tempting and wrong-headed to reason as follows: 
Major premise: If metaethical skepticism is true (and thus there 
are no fundamental, objective values), and 
Minor premise: If all substantive normative systems (Mill’s utili-
tarianism, Adler’s welfarism, etc.) entail fundamental, objective 
values, then 
Conclusion One: No substantive normative system can justify pub-
lic decisions (since all such systems are equally groundless), and 
                                                                                                                  
 40. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1964) (1739). 
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Conclusion Two: By default, some form of proceduralist normative 
system wins, most probably pluralism, which maintains that gov-
ernment is properly indifferent to substantive preferences. 
Stated more succinctly, if there are no real values out there to be dis-
covered, then it is tempting to conclude that the only proper process 
of arriving at substantive valuations in public affairs is by some spe-
cies of pluralism. 41 
 The superficial appeal of this pseudo-syllogism lies in the destruc-
tive power of its major, skeptical premise: If metaethical skepticism 
is granted, no single substantive normative position—utilitarianism, 
or welfarism, or whatever—can claim to be right or true. Conclusion 
One, in other words, is thoroughly sound. 
 But, as Adler points out, to affirm Conclusion Two is to assume 
too much. In particular, to derive a normative blessing on pluralistic 
process from the skeptical major premise is to violate that premise 
itself. As a matter of definition, if we grant the skeptical premise, we 
cannot consistently claim that any process, pluralistic or otherwise, 
is proper. The skeptical premise, in other words, sweeps away means 
as well as ends; there is no more an objectively right or good proce-
dure for making public decisions than there is an objectively right or 
good result of such decisions. Thus Adler is entirely correct to con-
clude, “Normative pluralism grounded upon skepticism is self-
defeating,” and “More generally, any kind of proceduralism founded 
upon skepticism is self-defeating.”42 As a matter of logic, such argu-
ments are, as Adler shows, technically invalid. 
 But it is one thing to say that the argument from the skeptical 
premise to a normative pluralist conclusion is invalid, and quite an-
other to say that the skeptical premise is false. Adler not only em-
braces the first position, as we have seen; he also quite explicitly em-
braces the second. Thus he insists that “[t]here are objective moral 
standards applicable to governmental choices and other human ac-
tions,” urging that “[a] persuasive case against moral skepticism, and 
in favor of moral cognitivism, has been presented by a number of con-
temporary philosophers working in metaethics.”43 
2.   The Chimera of Big-N Nihilism 
 Here we come, I’m convinced, to the second, and more significant, 
reason Adler offers to lead us up the metaethical alps: Quite explic-
itly, as we just saw, he believes that meta-ethical skepticism is 
wrong. But, at least implicitly, he must believe that error on this 
point matters as to his principal topic, his spirited (and I think gen-
                                                                                                                  
 41. See Adler, supra note 2, at 269-72. 
 42. Id. at 271. 
 43. Id. at 270-71. 
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erally successful) defense of welfarist politics. Otherwise—to put it as 
politely as possible—he’s wasting his time, and ours. But he isn’t—
or, which for me comes to the same thing here—he sincerely believes 
he isn’t. 
 Recall that Adler doesn’t need to deny the metaethical skeptics’ 
premise to show the illogic of deriving Big-P Proceduralism from it. 
As we have seen, he has already done that quite handily, in complete 
agreement with metaethical skeptics like me, as he himself main-
tains. 44 We affirm, as he does, that from our basic skeptical premise 
no “proper” procedure could possibly follow logically. But for Adler, I 
suspect, Big-P Proceduralism in political matters is, ultimately, a 
pretty small fish. What he and his fellow metaethical realists really 
fear is a true—or truly chimerical—Leviathan, what I will call Big-N 
Nihilism. 
 I suspect that he shares a fear common among metaethical real-
ists. They fear that the other metaethical turn, the negative answer 
of metaethical skepticism, inevitably leads, psychologically if not 
logically, to Nihilism at all normative levels: the personal, the micro-
political, the macro-political, and the cosmic.45 I, accordingly, need to 
show why metaethical skepticism cannot lead to Nihilism in theory 
and need not lead to Nihilism in fact.46 
C.   Exorcising the Ghost of Nihilism Future 
 To the extent that Adler’s fear has a logical foundation, it can eas-
ily be shown to be misguided. Indeed, the logical derivation of Nihil-
ism from metaethical skepticism partakes of precisely the same flaw 
as the logical derivation of normative pluralism from that source. 
Adler rightly shows that no normative positives, procedural or sub-
stantive, flow from metaethical skepticism. But he, or at least some 
of his fellow realists, seem to believe that something negative follows, 
namely, the negative conclusion that, normatively speaking, nothing 
can matter or, more strongly, we should value nothing. This is a sub-
                                                                                                                  
 44. See id. at 270-72. 
 45. See Atkinson, supra note 39, at 885, 956-57.  
 46. I should, perhaps, poin t out that Nihilism is not the worst “-ism” afoot in the land. 
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, it is a particularly unstable position; once you become 
too firmly committed to valuing nothing, nothing becomes, paradoxically, the thing you 
value. More dangerously, Nihilism can transmogrify from an essentially passive absence of 
commitment to valuing anything into an all-too-active commitment to destroying every-
thing. This distinction is nicely captured in the realist fear, not so much that Nihilism will 
become Nazis, as that Nihilists will have no answer to Nazism. See id. at 956-57. It is also 
nicely captured in the following exchange in the movie The Big Lebowski:  
Dude (Jeff Bridges):  They were Nihilists man, they kept saying they believe in 
nothing.  
Walter (John Goodman):  Nihilists! F— me, I mean, say what you want about 
the te nets of National Socialism, Dude, at least it’s an ethos. 
THE BIG LEBOWSKI (Polygram 1998). 
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tle, but very significant, logical lapse. Its source lies in an improper 
unpacking of the skeptical premise. 
1.   The Logical Case 
 Metaethical skeptics maintain (or, in their weaker form, suspect) 
that nothing has objective moral worth in and of itself. There is noth-
ing out there that we should value, or that we ought to do, per se. 
But the last Latinate phrase is critical. Metaethical skepticism does 
not hold that there is nothing out there we can value, or that some 
things out there are not the proper means to ends that are capable of 
being valued. On the skeptical premise, we are not obliged in an ob-
jective, ultimate sense to value anything. But it does not follow that 
we are, in an objective, ultimate sense, forbidden to value anything, 
or obliged to value nothing. Stated more succinctly, metaethical 
skepticism neither requires nor forbids any substantive values or 
value systems, including Big-N Nihilism. To be sure, we are free to 
reject all possible values, but we are not logically compelled to. From 
metaethical skepticism, no norms necessarily follow, positive or 
negative. We are free, logically at least, to value whatever we 
choose.47 
2.   The Psychological Case 
 But to be free to choose is not necessarily to be able to choose. 
Having dismissed realist worries that metaethical skepticism logi-
cally leads to Nihilism, we are still left with their somewhat vaguer 
worry that metaethical skepticism is somehow psychologically debili-
tating. This latter worry seems to be that, without the moral vita-
mins of real and objective values, our moral spines will somehow 
snap or, more likely, melt. In its stronger form, the worry is that 
metaethical skepticism inevitably leads to Nihilism; in its weaker 
form, that it typically or usually does. 
 Since the psychological case against metaethical skepticism is 
more a matter of anxiety than argument, it is more difficult to dispel 
than the illogical logical critique. Of its two forms, the stronger pre-
sents less of a problem; all we need is the single example of a 
metaethical skeptic who did not lapse into Nihilism. The less ambi-
tious doubts of the weaker form are the real challenge, for they are 
more insidious and individualized, if not more insistent: never mind 
that someone, somewhere, managed to cast off normative absolutes 
without sinking into Nihilism; what about me, here and now? 
 My argument applies to both forms, starting with the stronger 
and moving to the weaker. This is largely because the stature of my 
                                                                                                                  
 47. See Atkinson, supra note 39, at 881-886. 
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historical counter-example is so great, and the nature of his skepti-
cism so accessible, that once we understand his case, we can scarcely 
help feeling better about our own.  
 a.   The Case Against the Strong Psychological Argument: The Pla-
tonic Socrates.—My example of a metaethically skeptical non-Nihilist 
is none other than the Platonic Socrates. The Delphic Oracle fa-
mously, if delphically, declared Socrates the wisest of men. Socrates 
assumed that the distinctiveness of his wisdom lay in one very pecu-
liar piece of knowledge: unlike other people, he knew that he knew 
nothing about the things that really matter.48 This is, obviously, a 
very skeptical beginning. But it didn’t lead him to Nihilism; it led 
him to a life of inquiry.49 We all know the Socratic maxim: Know thy-
self. We often fail to note, however, that it is not a declaration of 
moral fact, but a moral imperative, a recommendation, if not a com-
mand. It is, I think, what Kant would call a hypothetical impera-
tive.50 These imperatives are of the form “if you want X, then you 
must do Y.” For Socrates, the desired X was a life worth living, and 
the required Y, the only way to get there, was to live out the impera-
tive, “Know thyself.” The undesirability of any alternative is cap-
tured in the third famous Socratism: “The unexamined life is not 
worth living.”51 
 Socrates proved that third, negative point over and over again, in 
his dialogues with Athens’s sophomoric pseudo-savants52 and misdi-
rected men of action.53 Again and again, he shows them up as fools. 
Not, significantly, as living lives out of accord with some objective, 
cosmic order, but simply as living lives not worth living, in the only 
sense that he seemed to think mattered: lives that we who share his 
life of inquiry would not want to live. And, in doing this, he ulti-
mately proved his positive point: that the examined life is worth liv-
ing. If we live that way, we may not be objectively right by any ex-
ternal, eternal standard. But we will be like Socrates. For some of us, 
                                                                                                                  
 48. See PLATO, Apology, in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 423, 427 (Eric H. Warmington 
& Philip G. Rouse eds., W.H.D. Rouse trans., Mentor Books 1956). 
 49. See id. at 429. 
 50. See IMANNUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31-32 
(Lewis White Beck trans., Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1959) (1785). 
 51. See PLATO, supra note 48, at 443. 
 52. See, e.g., PLATO, Gorgias, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES 229 (Edith Hamilton & Hut-
ington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1961) (Socrates’s dialogue with the sophist Gor-
gias and his followers); PLATO, Ion, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra at 215 (Socrates’s dia-
logue with Ion, an award-winning reciter and interpreter of Homer). 
 53. See, e.g., PLATO, Euthyphro, in COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 52, at 169 
(Socrates’s dialogue with a young man about to prosecute his father for murder); PLATO, 
Symposium, in GREAT DIALOGUES, supra note 48, at 116 (Socrates’s jesting at the expense 
of Alcibiades, subsequently an ill-fated leader of Athenian forces in the Peloponnesian 
War). 
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that’s enough; in any case, it’s not nothing, and it’s certainly not Ni-
hilism. 
 b.   The Case Against the Weak Psychological Argument: You (and 
Descartes).—But, even if I’m right about Socrates, I’ve only dispensed 
with the strong psychological case against metaethical skepticism, 
that is, that it always leads to Nihilism. That is cold comfort to the 
rest of us, for it leaves the weak case very much intact: Maybe 
metaethical skepticism leads to Nihilism not always, but often—or 
usually, or in all cases but that of Socrates. And this weak case may 
include the psychologically scariest case, one’s own: Maybe I will be-
come a Nihilist if I become a metaethical skeptic. 
 For what it’s worth, the worries of that “I” are not true for me. I 
know I deeply doubt the existence of objective values, and I also 
know that I am not a Nihilist. But it would be impossible for me to 
convince you of that, and unseemly for me to try. Asserting for your 
edification that I myself am a metaethical skeptic, but not a Nihilist, 
would be no better than an empty boast unless you already knew 
that to be true. And you could not really know that unless you and I 
were already friends in the way that, for example, Mark Seidenfeld 
and I are friends: fellow inquirers into the things that really matter, 
always with the utmost concern for one another’s souls. For the ulti-
mate insurance against Nihilism is this: Your friends won’t let you 
fall into the abyss; they will be your lifeline back to the light—and 
you, theirs. And, in any case, neither my case nor Socrates’s could 
fully reassure you that you aren’t in danger of Nihilism. 
 Thus, to rebut for you the weaker form of the psychological argu-
ment against metaethical skepticism, the example I need to give you 
is none other than you, yourself. That, alas, I cannot do in the ab-
stract and from afar; I would have to be your friend. But, short of 
that, I can do several, hopefully useful, things. First, I can show you 
that you are already closer to metaethical skepticism than you may 
suppose. Even so, I can show you, in the second place, that you are in 
no danger of losing your grip on the values you hold dear. Finally, I 
can assure you that your incipient metaethical skepticism will not 
isolate you from an enduring strand of the western moral tradition—
that, indeed, it is close to the position of several of our moral heroes 
(and to God, if God is as those heroes have said). 
 First, then, let’s see if you don’t share with me (and, much more 
impressively, with Hume and Socrates) a doubt that the foundation 
of goodness or rightness lies any deeper than your dialogue with me 
(and again, more impressively, with them). To approach your own 
metaethical skepticism, try this two-part thought experiment. First 
of all, try to remember the foundation of your moral beliefs, and the 
line of proof that you think is their ultimate pedigree. Either you can 
remember it, or you can’t. If you can remember it, allow yourself to 
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wonder whether Socrates or Hume (never mind me) couldn’t refute 
it, couldn’t show you that it is seriously flawed, or at least not so in-
ternally consistent or so externally well grounded as you would like 
to think. 
 If you are not convinced that the great skeptics could not shake 
your moral foundation, ask yourself this further question: Am I in 
deep despair? And I mean deep enough to take you to Big N-
Nihilism, deep enough to make you indifferent to leading a meaning-
ful life, or more mundanely, to helping out or even caring for your 
closest friends and family. If you are, you have my condolences, but 
also my congratulations: You have proved that metaethical skepti-
cism may lead to Nihilism. 
 (But, before you congratulate yourself too roundly, read on. In 
particular, beware the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy. Recall that 
my congratulations were conditional: you have only proved that 
metaethical skepticism may cause Nihilism, not that it actually does, 
or did, even in your own case. You may have lapsed into Nihilism on 
account of events in your psychological life other than your brush 
with metaethical skepticism. Your despair of all meaning in life may 
well be the result of a dangerous chemical imbalance, not an alleg-
edly dangerous idea. Nor do I doubt that external events can drive 
one to Nihilistic despair—loss, for example, of one’s friends or family, 
cause, or country;54 what I doubt is that metaethical doubts about the 
pedigree of all value will ever lead anyone to despair of the value to 
himself or herself of these very particular things.55 And note, fi-
nally—and, from my perspective, hopefully—that you cannot have 
lapsed quite yet into total Nihilism; if you had, you would most likely 
not have read on this far.) 
 Alternatively, what if you can’t even remember the foundation of 
your moral beliefs? Either you have forgotten it or you never had one. 
If you’ve forgotten it, but remember having had it, try to recover it; if 
you do, go back to step one. If you can’t remember ever having had 
one, ask yourself this: How have I made it this far, without lapsing 
into Nihilism? At this point, you may discover that you have been a 
metaethical skeptic all along. If you don’t suddenly feel yourself slip-
ping into deep despair, I’ve made my case to you, though, of course, 
only provisionally—as you get used to the idea, it might drive you 
over to the Dark Side. Or you may realize that you never really 
thought about such supposedly deep matters, but simply assumed 
                                                                                                                  
 54. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE EXPERIENCE OF DEFEAT passim (1984) (examining 
the e ffects of the monarchy’s restoration on proponents of the Puritan Revolution). 
 55. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Nihilism Need Not Apply: Law and Literature in John 
Barth’s The Floating Opera, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming Fall 2000) (arguing that protago-
nist’s depression, not his metaethical skepticism, lay at the root of his Nihilism); see also 
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 558 (1981) (“A depressed person not only 
chooses to be affectless—he chooses that the world correspond and be valueless too.”). 
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that what you held dear was ultimately grounded on some very real 
goodness. If that’s the case, you’re ready to dig down and find it. But 
are you really excited about it? More importantly, if your digging just 
took you, as it were, not to the bottom of things, but simply out the 
other side of the earth, would you despair? I doubt it; more impor-
tantly, don’t you doubt it? 
 A third kind of doubt is relevant here. As we have seen, you may 
find yourself doubting that your moral system has any foundation, in 
the sense of being objectively right or true. This first worry is 
metaethical: Does the moral faith I keep have any foundation other 
than me, keeping it; do the things I value have any value other than 
my valuing them? What’s more, you may find yourself doubting 
whether your own adherence to your moral system can survive your 
doubts about its foundation. This is a psychological worry: If I am the 
only foundation of the faith I keep, can I keep on keeping it? If my 
valuing is the only value of the things I value, will they remain valu-
able to me? But notice that there’s a third doubt you can’t have, ei-
ther logically or psychologically: you can’t doubt that you have a 
moral system, or that there are things you value. (Not, in any case, if 
that doubt disturbs you.) Psychologically, you may lapse into Nihil-
ism, the loss of all value. But logically, you aren’t there yet, or more 
precisely, you can’t always have been there. If you were, again, you 
wouldn’t be reading this. 
 Now suppose you dig down, really deep, and don’t simply fall out 
the other side of the ethical earth. Instead, you discover Golden Tab-
lets of Universal and Eternal Norms. Never mind, for now, how you’d 
know they’re genuine (a doubt I doubt we could ever really get past). 
Let’s assume you’re convinced they are real, and you proceed to read 
them. To your surprise—and remember: this is only a thought ex-
periment—they tell you that everything you ever held dear was way 
off base, that your moral up was really down, and vice versa. No-
tice—critically—that at that very moment you would have a choice. 
You could embrace the new and true way, turning your back on all 
you have ever held dear, which most certainly reflects similar judg-
ments by all those you’ve known and loved, living and dead. Or you 
could stick with what you’ve got. Indeed, if you’re tempted to ask 
your friends about what you’ve found, notice how near you’ve come to 
making their opinion or, more precisely, your conversation with 
them—the touchstone of your Golden Tablets. 
 c.   The Strange Case of God.—Now we must backtrack a bit. So 
far, we have been dealing with those who don’t know—or have seri-
ous doubt about—the foundations of their value systems. Now we 
must turn to those who, in effect, have found the Golden Tablets, or 
at least know where to look for them.  
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 Some of you, I suspect, gave a sheepish answer at Step One. In 
your heart of hearts, you admitted, with wholly unnecessary embar-
rassment, that you know the foundation of your moral system and 
that it—more likely, He or She—is God. Many a moral system, in-
cluding some of the most elegant, takes essentially the form of a 
bumper sticker: “God said it, I heard it, and that settles it.” For the 
metaethical realists, that’s fine: all you have to do to make such a 
system coherent—indeed, logically unassailable—is to assume that 
what God declares to be good is, really and truly, good.56 For 
metaethical skeptics, that’s also fine: all you have to do is ally your-
self with the God party, for whatever reasons you yourself find ap-
pealing.  
 But those who take a different line pose a bit of a problem for you, 
and for God. You will have noted that the form of argument you find 
compelling (“because God said so”) doesn’t have much purchase on 
them. To talk constructively with them, at least until they, too, hear 
God’s voice, you will have to put your argument in terms that are in-
telligible, and appealing, to them. If they, like Adler and I, are welfa-
rists, and if your God takes a propitious view of humanity, that 
shouldn’t pose any real problems. You can work to advance human 
welfare because it is God’s will; they, because human welfare is their 
will.  
 But what about God? Let’s suppose God, too, is a welfarist. 57 Sup-
pose He were to present us with a very detailed blueprint for human 
welfare, completely in accord with Adler’s concept. And suppose, fur-
ther, that He were to say “Just do it”—not “or else,” but “for your own 
good.” “I’ve got it all figured out, down to the last detail. I’ve not only 
rank-ordered all of the various values that go into my and Adler’s 
version of welfare; I’ve also resolved all particular applications. It’s 
all right here.” Wouldn’t He be leaving something out, and wouldn’t 
that something be, in a word, process? Constituted as we are, don’t 
we want to have a hand in just that ordering process, at the retail 
                                                                                                                  
 56. See Leff, supra note 31, at 1230 (“There is then, this one longstanding, widely ac-
cepted ethical and legal system that is based upon the edicts of an unchallengeable creator 
of the right and the good, in which the only job of the person who would do right is to find 
what the evaluator said.”); cf. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPEDIA, supra note 38, at 
983 (distinguishing the classical version of ethical naturalism, which included norms de-
rived from divine commands, from most modern versions, which do not); Atkinson, supra 
note 39, at 879 n.97 (distinguishing realism based on divine fiat from other forms). 
 57. See MILL, supra note 24, at 35. God’s being a welfarist is hardly a necessary as-
sumption. The most likely alternative is that God puts Himself first. See JAMES M. 
GUSTAFSON, ETHICS FROM A THEOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE (1981) (outlining a theocentric, as 
opposed to anthropocentric, ethics); Robert Burns, Holy Willie’s Prayer, in 2 NORTON 
ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 89, 95 (5th ed. 1986) (parodying the God of theocen-
tric ethics as “thou, wha . . . [s]ends ane to heaven and ten to hell, A’ for thy glory”). But 
this alternative is somewhat out of current favor and is in considerable tension with Jew-
ish and Christian tradition, as we shall see; in any case, it’s a bit hard on God. Why con-
sider Him any less humane than we humans aspire to be? 
2000]  REFORMED WELFARE STATE 363 
 
level if not at the wholesale? To put it most succinctly, doesn’t human 
welfare include, at least at the margin, choosing what human welfare 
is to be? 
 Though Adler admits the “intuitive resonance” of this position, 
which he calls “the interest-based defense of proceduralism,” he re-
jects it emphatically. His reason reveals the root of the problem: He 
cares nothing for procedures that do not enhance “the accuracy of the 
. . . decisionmaking process.”58 But this, of course, assumes that the 
decision is merely a choice among means to pre-existing, exogenous 
ends. If ends themselves are to be chosen in the process, then it 
makes no sense to speak of “accuracy of decisionmaking,” because, ex 
hypothesi, we don’t know at the beginning of the process what par-
ticular ends we are aiming for. 
 At this point, as I hope you’re beginning to see, the supra-
macrocosmic and the sub-microcosmic levels collapse into each other, 
at least in the Platonic tradition of humanism. What we want is a 
cosmic order that recognizes and values the delight we take in decid-
ing, in conversations among ourselves, the very things we value, up 
to and including the meaning of justice at the very highest level. Soc-
rates, in principle, would doubtlessly be happy for God to join in the 
discussion. But Socrates, in practice, was very loath to have anyone, 
probably including God himself, have the final say. When he got the 
cryptic word from Delphi about his wisdom, remember, he didn’t 
send for further divine enlightenment. Instead, he started talking 
with his friends. 
 Socrates is not alone in this attitude, nor is this attitude as irrelig-
ious as you might suppose. (Socrates himself, you will remember, 
said he pursued his skeptical inquiry in the service of the god,59 
though his initial purpose had been to prove the Delphic oracle 
wrong in declaring him the wisest man.60) Consider the following de-
bate, recorded in the Talmud, between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Ye-
hoshua. Substantively, it involved a classically mundane matter of 
administrative law, the ancient equivalent of an OSHA or EPA regu-
lation: the proper configuration of a kosher bread oven. Procedurally, 
it more resembled Marbury v. Madison61 for it raised the issue of ul-
timate appeals in Toranic disputes. Here, in its entirety, is the case: 
On that day, Rabbi Eliezer used all the arguments in the world. 
He produced powerful arguments to justify his position that the 
oven should be considered unreconstructed and not susceptible to 
ritual impurity. But the Sages did not accept his arguments, and 
insisted that the oven was susceptible to ritual impurity. After 
                                                                                                                  
 58. Adler, supra note 2, at 284. 
 59. See PLATO, supra note 48, at 429. 
 60. See id. at 427. 
 61. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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Rabbi Eliezer saw that he was not able to persuade his colleagues 
with logical arguments, he said to them: “If the Halakhah is in ac-
cordance with me, let this carob tree prove it.” The carob tree im-
mediately uprooted itself and moved one hundred cubits—and 
some say four hundred cubits—from its original place. The Sages 
said to him: “Proof cannot be brought from a carob tree.” Rabbi 
Eliezer then said to the Sages, “If the Halakhah is in accordance 
with me, let the channel of water prove it.” The channel of water 
immediately flowed backward, against the direction in which it 
usually flowed. The Sages said to him: “Proof cannot be brought 
from a channel of water either.” Rabbi Eliezer then said to the 
Sages: “If the Halakhah is in accordance with me, let the walls of 
the House of Study prove it.” The walls of the House of Study then 
leaned and were about to fall. Rabbi Yehoshua, one of Rabbi 
Eliezer’s chief opponents among the Sages, rebuked the falling 
walls, saying to them: “If Talmudic scholars argue with one an-
other in their discussions about the Halakhah, what affair is it of 
yours?” The walls did not fall down, out of respect for Rabbi Yeh o-
shua, nor did they straighten, out of respect for Rabbi Eliezer, and 
indeed those walls still remain leaning to this day. Rabbi Eliezer 
then said to the Sages: “If the Halakhah is in accordance with me, 
let it be proved directly from Heaven.” Suddenly a heavenly voice 
went forth and said to the Sages: “Why are you disputing with 
Rabbi Eliezer? The Halakhah is in accordance with him in all cir-
cumstances!” Rabbi Yehoshua rose to his feet and quoted a portion 
of a verse (Deuteronomy 30:12), saying; “The Torah is not in 
heaven!”62 
 If these two examples, Socrates and Rabbi Yehoshua, are a bit 
highfalutin for you, I have a final, homier model of metaethically 
skeptical humanism: Huckleberry Finn. Remember the morally piv-
otal scene in which Huck contemplates writing the Widow Douglas to 
tell her that her escaped slave, Jim, is with him. Huck is convinced 
this is the right thing to do, and he firmly resolves to do it. But then 
his thoughts drift back over how he and Jim have befriended each 
other on their odyssey down the river. He realizes—ironically of 
course—that he can’t do what is right: more or less literally sell his 
friend down the river. He has already written the “redeeming” letter; 
now he is having second thoughts about it. In his own words: 
 It was a close place. I took it up, and held it in my hand. I was a 
trembling, because I’d got to decide, forever, betwixt two things, 
and I knowed it. I studied a minute, sort of holding my breath, and 
then says to myself: 
 “All right then, I’ll go to hell”—and tore it up. 
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 It was awful thoughts and awful words, but they was said. And I 
let them stay said; and never thought no more about reforming.63 
 Nothing—not divine wrath, not eternal damnation, certainly not 
metaethical theorizing—could make Huck betray a friend or, more to 
the point, the moral world he and his friend had created together. 
His was not quite so bold a declaration of moral independence as that 
of Milton’s Satan:  
The mind is its own place, and in itself 
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.64 
It was more akin to his own maker’s homey quip, “Heaven for cli-
mate, hell for society”65—with the critical qualification that Huck’s 
society was his friends. 
 It is, of course, entirely possible that one of your friends will be 
God. We have already supposed that He might well be a welfarist; 
neither case is wholly hypothetical. The Jewish and Christian scrip-
tures tell us Abraham was His friend.66 And consider the preamble to 
the very Decalogue itself—“I am the LORD your God, who brought 
you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.”67 This is 
sometimes read to stake out a kind of proprietary claim: “I’ve deliv-
ered you from bondage; now you’re my slaves.” But isn’t it better read 
as a reminder of past friendship, and promise of more to come: “I am 
the LORD, and I have your welfare at heart; remember how 
wretched you were back in Egypt? That’s all behind you now; what’s 
ahead is a land flowing with milk and honey. I know all about you, 
all the way back to Adam and Eve, and I’ll tell you this: If you really 
want to flourish in the land I’m about to give you, you would do well 
to consider these Ten (Very Serious) Suggestions. Ignore them at 
your peril. And that’s not a threat; it’s a prediction.” 
 Indeed, isn’t thinking that God is not a welfarist tantamount to 
reading all those Biblical sheep-and-shepherd metaphors a bit too 
literally? Do you really think He plans to fleece us—or worse? And if 
you really thought He did, would you really be so docile? There is, in 
fact, good reason to think that God Himself would tolerate, maybe 
even prefer, less sheepish metaphorical sheep. In the Christian par-
able of the final judgment, the proverbial separation of the sheep 
from the goats, Christ the King welcomes just such independent 
sheep into his Father’s fold: 
                                                                                                                  
 63. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 297 (Harper & Bros. 
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 66. See 2 Chronicles 20:7; Isaiah 41:8; James 2:23. 
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 Then the King will say to those at his right hand, “Come you 
that are blessed by my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for 
you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and you 
gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I 
was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you gave 
me clothing, I was sick and you took care of me, I was in prison 
and you visited me.” 
 Then the righteous will answer him, “Lord, when was it that we 
saw you hungry and gave you food, or thirsty and gave you some-
thing to drink? And when was it that we saw you a stranger and 
welcomed you, or naked and gave you clothing? And when was it 
that we saw you sick or in prison and visited you?” 
 And the King will answer them, “Truly, I tell you, just as you did 
it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you 
did it to me.”68 
 Those who did the Father’s will, albeit not because they knew it to 
be His will, turn out nonetheless to have been on His side, in His 
flock. They did not despair of doing social justice for want of the 
knowledge of that foundation, nor were they rejected because they 
did not know. The Father knew them by their fruits; as the Gospels 
tell us elsewhere, so should we. Those fruits, you will have noticed, 
are very like Adler’s notion of welfare. And so the parable should ap-
ply, I would argue, to metaethical skeptics who embrace Adler’s posi-
tion. 
 The Talmud is as elegant as the Gospel—and a good deal less am-
biguous—on precisely the point of God’s preference for dialogue. Con-
sider, again, the debate between Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yehoshua, 
and—near the end—God. Subsequent commentators wondered 
among themselves how Rabbi Yehoshua had managed to get the bet-
ter of God. Opinions varied, but one of them, attributed to a vision of 
the prophet Elijah, was this: 
The Gemara relates that generations later Rabbi Natan met the 
Prophet Elijah. . . . Rabbi Natan asked Elijah about the debate be-
tween Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua. He said to him: “What 
did the Holy One, blessed be He, do at that time when Rabbi Yeho-
shua refused to heed the heavenly voice?” In reply, Elijah said to 
Rabbi Natan: “God smiled and said: ‘My sons have defeated Me, 
My sons have defeated Me!’” God’s sons “defeated Him” with their 
arguments. Rabbi Yehoshua was correct in his contention that a 
view confirmed by majority vote must be accepted, even where God 
Himself holds the opposite view.69 
 Note, too, that in these two traditions, the Socratic and the Judeo-
Christian, there is another collapse that parallels the merger of the 
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super-macrocosmic and the sub-microcosmic arenas of process. The 
way things are valued, dialogue itself becomes a fundamental part of 
human welfare. In that way, process and substance merge. To para-
phrase Mill, what we welfarists really want is neither a pig satisfied, 
nor Socrates dissatisfied, but the best of both: Socrates satisfied. And 
Socrates satisfied, in Socrates’s own terms, is Socrates talking with 
anyone who will join him about the things that really matter. 
 Thus, at least at the sub-microcosmic level, contrary to what Adler 
suggests, process is not merely instrumental. Nor is it merely one 
preference among others, on the same level as “discrimination or 
governmental action that violates moral rights,” to use those he ten-
dentiously lists alongside it. 70 In its highest, Socratic form, process is, 
rather, as Aristotle put it, 71 working with our friends to make our-
selves good. That, to be sure, sounds like an instrumental value, a 
means to welfarist ends. But, for Aristotle, there is more: friendship 
is the one value that we would not give up, even if we were offered all 
the others. 72 And the reason is that it and the others are inseparable: 
the process of deciding with our friends what goods to value, and how 
much, is itself an end, perhaps the highest. 
D.   Two Final Pitfalls 
1.   Confusing Subjective Agreement with Objective Truth 
 But perhaps we have proved too much: If, through this very sort of 
dialogic process, you find yourself agreeing with me, perhaps we have 
found objective moral truth. Adler, and his fellow realists, suggest as 
much, in either of two equally unpersuasive ways. First, they suggest 
that our shared subjective preference for certain values is just the 
kind of objectivity they are looking for. In Adler’s words, “[s]ome of 
our idealized preferences or judgments do converge; and it is just in 
the case of such convergence that we can speak of objective rightness 
or goodness, rather than mere subjective preference.”73 
 The problem here is an ambiguity in what it means for a state-
ment about morals to be true or “objectively right.” It is quite true, in 
a descriptive sense, to say, “The Romans thought slavery was mor-
ally right”; in fact, they did. But that is a long way from concluding 
that the Romans were themselves right to think so, in a normative 
sense. This is so, by the same token, for our own agreed values. It is 
objectively true that we share them, but from that it does not follow 
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that they are normatively right. This is precisely what the metaethi-
cal skeptic J.L. Mackey meant with the observation that “[s]ubjective 
agreement would give intersubjective values, but intersubjectivity is 
not objectivity.”74 
2.   Invoking “True” Processes to Ensure “True” Results 
 But this merely sets the stage for the realists’ next move, the sug-
gestion that there is something about the way we arrived at our 
agreement that makes it special, that is, objectively true in a norma-
tive, not merely descriptive, sense. Here is the argument in barest 
outline, beginning with an example. The Romans, clever fellows 
though they were, were notoriously under-inclusive in their norma-
tive conversations; so, too, were their much-admired moral precep-
tors, the classical Greeks. Process, or at least circumstances, may 
undermine the rightness of moral agreement. Conversely, it is tempt-
ing to conclude, we may be able to get it right if we go about it 
rightly. Thus, to quote Adler again, “Objectivity, with respect to mat-
ters of value, morality, and norms, is plausibly understood as the 
convergence of judgments or preferences under ideal conditions.”75 
 This, too, is a very old game, and one that we cannot play out fully 
here. But we can at least see where it is headed, and how much it 
looks like where we have already been. This is, in effect, the perfect 
procedural complement to the realists’ substantive search for objec-
tive goodness; it simply replaces looking for objectively good “whats” 
with a parallel search for objectively good “hows.”76 And, once we 
move from the abstract to the concrete, the complementarity is even 
more striking. The ideal condition is usually one of “perfect rational-
ity” or “thoughtfulness” or being “well informed.” Thus the conditions 
under which objectively right ends are found involve having one such 
end already: typically, reason.77 This, alas, comes dangerously close 
to circularity: to guarantee our arrival at the right substantive good, 
we must insist on following a procedure that itself implies that good. 
We reach reason by proceeding rationally. The expedient of turning 
nouns into adverbs may get you where you want to go, but it does not 
guarantee that where you wind up will be on any higher or more 
solid ground, metaethically speaking. 
 Adler, very much to his credit, admits as much. As he sees it, the 
proper philosophical foundation for welfarism will have to be either 
                                                                                                                  
 74. J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 22 (1977). 
 75. Adler, supra note 2, at 298 (emphasis added). 
 76. See Leff, supra note 31, at 1236 (“By definition, one who considers force an appro-
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 77. See Adler, supra note 2, at 300. 
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“sophisticated preferentialism” or “sophisticated objectivism.” Under 
the former, welfare is what people really want, “under ideal condi-
tions . . . suitably restricted”; under the latter, welfare is, again, what 
people really want, but only “in light of the totality of objective wel-
fare goods.”78 Adler prefers the former, largely because it is closer to 
neoclassicalism, 79 but he admits serious, and closely parallel, prob-
lems with both, very much as I have suggested. “Sophisticated objec-
tivism” raises an obvious question: “What are the grounds for placing 
various goods on the list?”80 Similarly, in Adler’s words, “sophisti-
cated preferentialism, as here articulated, contains a large and em-
barrassing lacuna: the failure to state just how preferences should be 
‘restricted’ such that thus-restricted preferences, and only those, are 
welfare productive.”81 Adler admits the danger, which I identified 
above, that specifying these conditions will collapse into circularity.82 
But he believes “the problem of preference restriction . . . will even-
tually be solved.”83 Thus Adler himself does not purport to have the 
very solution he admits to be critical to his position; he is not so 
much a metaethical realist as a metaethical optimist. 
E.   Summary 
 I, as a metaethical skeptic, very much doubt we will find what 
Adler would have us look for. That, however, does not make me a 
pessimist, over against his optimism. As I said at the outset, I’m con-
vinced he’s looking for something we don’t need. We who have 
adopted the substantive ethical position of (human) welfarism al-
ready have the only metaethical answer we need: our own affirma-
tion, in dialogue with each other, of our shared position. In that 
sense, I am not so much a metaethical skeptic, much less a metaethi-
cal pessimist, as I am a metaethical triumphalist: we have met—
better yet, chosen—the ultimate moral measure, and it is us. 
 You, with Adler, may well be more comfortable awaiting objective 
proof of his procedurally perfect world. I, for my part, only hope you 
see how much a world of “ideal conditions” and “suitably restricted 
preferences,” unpacked to your and his liking, would resemble the 
sub-microcosmic world of Socratic dialogue. That would be a familiar 
world, and to many of us a comfortable world—exactly the world we 
would choose to occupy ourselves and extend to others. But the fact 
                                                                                                                  
 78. Id. at 265. 
 79. See id. at 267. He is also impressed that “preferentialist views are much more 
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 80. Id. at 266 (footnote omitted). 
 81. Id. at 265-66. 
 82. See id. at 266. 
 83. Id. at 267. 
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that we desire it does not make it any more objectively good. Fortu-
nately (but I think not fortuitously), the fact that it is not objectively 
good (or may not be) does not make it any less desirable (or need 
not). 
V.   IMPLICATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 I promised my friend Mark Seidenfeld I’d at least try to make my 
philosophical points relevant to administrative law. At the core of my 
ethos, nothing is more important than delivering on such a prom-
ise—or, at very least, explaining to the friend why you can’t. Here, 
thankfully, I can. My philosophical conversation with Adler bears on 
administrative law in three related ways: as to substantive matters, 
as to procedural matters and, finally (for want of a better word), as to 
meta-matters. 
A.   Substance 
 The ideal welfarist state will give Socrates what he wants: a world 
in which everyone who is willing can join his conversation about the 
two fundamental questions with which we began: personal virtue 
and social justice. Though this is admittedly abstract and metaphori-
cal, I mean it also as concrete and literal. Plato clearly designed his 
dialogues to draw his readers into a life-altering encounter—a very 
real conversation—with Socrates; no welfarist can be satisfied with 
any state that doesn’t guarantee all its citizens a reasonable oppor-
tunity to read Plato in precisely this way. That, I hardly need to re-
mind you, will require a massive redirection of our current educa-
tional system.  
 There must, of course, be more. We may well have enjoyed our 
morning with Seidenfeld and Adler and—metaphorically at least, 
with Socrates. But, for my part, I want to spend at least some of my 
late afternoons more literally with Socrates, communing with him in 
the dialogues of Plato. And some afternoons I want to spend in a way 
that the Platonic Socrates thought dangerous: with the tragic poets 
and their modern counterparts, the writers of fiction. Some whole 
days, dawn to dusk, I want to spend almost entirely differently, sim-
ply cultivating my own garden. Not metaphorically, and not for the 
reason Voltaire’s Candide gave: because I must. Rather, because my 
pantheon includes not just Plato and Homer, but also Le Nôtre and 
Capability Brown. If I were a better person, as humanists have al-
ways understood better person to be and as many of you doubtlessly 
are, I’d reserve a little of the evening to do what Socrates said the 
gods enjoined him to do all along: practice music.84 I’d learn to play, 
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at least a bit, and I’d learn to listen better, with deeper understand-
ing and with wider appreciation. And most of us, I suspect, look for-
ward, as the evening grows later still, not only to rest, but also to de-
lights the original Puritans were unembarrassed to claim as part of 
their Paradise.85 
 It is not too much to ask that a just society make all of this, and 
more, available to every human being on earth. Indeed, in the welfa-
rist, social democratic tradition, to ask anything less is to ask just 
that much too little. 
B.   Process 
 As Adler rightly foresees, however, this does not require that a 
welfarist be a Big-P Proceduralist at the micro- or macro-political 
level—except, as I argue, in matters of adjudication. Now, I think, we 
are in a better position to see why process is so important in that 
context. When fundamental goods are at stake, we want those who 
are about to lose them to be able to enter into a dialogue with those 
who are about to take them. And now, too, we are in a better position 
to see why the civic republicans value process in the rulemaking side 
of politics as well. They long, quite consistently with their own So-
cratic leanings, for a political world in which everyone acts with the 
supreme Socratic social virtue: concern for one another’s souls, or, in 
Adlerian terms, for each other’s welfare. I don’t doubt that this is de-
sirable, but I very much doubt that it is possible. To put it bluntly, 
the world is too big, and too bad. 
 Too big in the sense that, as Seidenfeld admits and our own Fed-
eralists foresaw,86 a continental nation cannot run its business in the 
way of a Greek polis or, for that matter, a confederation of Swiss 
Cantons or Dutch provinces. The internet may make us all neigh-
bors, but nothing can make it possible for us all to be friends. 
 But that isn’t the worst news. It is ultimately the world’s badness, 
as much as its bigness, that means we cannot all be friends, and 
that, accordingly, deliberative process is a dubious goal for politics, 
micro and macro. Here, I believe, Augustine makes the best case: evil 
is not merely a matter of ignorance, as Socrates seemed to think,87 or 
even of willful turning from good, as some Jewish and Christian sects 
suppose.88 It derives, rather, from a fundamental flaw in human na-
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ture itself, a basic inability, not merely a voluntary refusal, to em-
brace humanist, or welfarist, values. 89 But, in the arena of politics, 
maybe it was Socrates who, ironically, made the best case against de-
liberation: the Athenian assembly, after hearing his apologia pro vita 
sua, put him to death. 
 This is emphatically not to suggest political Nihilism, a despair of 
successfully pursuing welfarist goals in political arenas. Those most 
thorough-going of Augustinians, the English Puritans, were proof 
enough of that. Nor is it to say that deliberation is never good, as a 
means toward welfarist goals. Both the English and the American 
Revolutionists included deliberation in their constitutions for pre-
cisely this reason, and rightly so. It is to say, however, that one can 
embrace their proceduralism-with-a-little-p, as a means rather than 
as an end. One can be, as Adler and I are, welfarists in politics, micro 
and macro, without being Big-P Proceduralists. One can say to proc-
ess-mired administrators, as the Lord Protector said to his first Par-
liament, “I think it my duty to tell you that it is not for the profit of 
these Nations, nor for common and public good, for you to continue 
here any longer.”90 
C.   Meta-Matters 
 By labeling these last items meta-matters, beyond being cute, I 
want to emphasize an important implication of something I’ve al-
ready said: the absence of any “real” foundation for our political and 
ethical commitments cannot undermine our faith in welfarist values. 
If this is so, and if advancing those values is fundamental to our poli-
tics, then it must follow that what administrative law scholars like 
Adler and Seidenfeld do is more important than what scholars of 
metaethics do. As a sometime scholar of metaethics myself, I firmly 
believe that. To put it otherwise, I’m a little-m metaethicist. To me, 
the kind of concerns I discussed above have no intrinsic interest. 
They only matter as a means of keeping us on the welfarist track and 
preventing derailment in either of two directions. The first, and least 
troubling, is the worry that metaethical skepticism will lead to the 
nowhere of Big-N Nihilism. 
 The second, and more serious risk, is not presented in Adler’s pa-
per, but is very much afoot in the larger world. It is the danger that 
some of his fellow realists will convince you that welfarism is “really” 
wrong, and that you should not embrace it. The answer to that, I 
have tried to show, comes down to this: Gimme that old time religion; 
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if it was good enough for Socrates (and Oliver and Abe and Woodrow 
and Franklin and Eleanor and Lyndon), it’s good enough for me. And 
what was good enough for them, let us not forget, was looking out for 
the least well off, even as they cultivated the excellence of the best. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 If what I’ve said about meta-matters is right, then our scholarship 
should not move back defensively toward its foundations, but for-
ward, toward its goals. We need to design, in careful consultation 
with anyone who’s interested, an acceptable and practicable means of 
achieving the great goal of humanism, classical and modern: univer-
sal human flourishing. To that end, it is vitally important that we get 
the process right; the horrific wrong turns of thorough-going human-
isms like Leninism and Maoism are proof enough of that. To avoid 
both similar catastrophes and smaller mis-steps, we need exactly the 
kind of scholarship to which the participants in this symposium have 
devoted their careers (myself excepted, not out of false modesty, but 
for labor in a neighboring vineyard). Of such scholarship, I can think 
of no better example than the paper Professor Adler has presented to 
us. 
 My only real contribution is to make explicit what is deeply im-
plicit in his mode of presentation. The only basis on which we can be 
asked to accept any such proposal is this: our careful mutual consid-
eration. That must ultimately be the measure of all things, human 
and even divine. (Indeed, if what we value most in ourselves is truly 
made in the image of God—and if what Huck Finn and Socrates and 
the Talmudic scribes all teach us is true—then God Himself wouldn’t 
have it any other way.) 
 
